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ABSTRAK 
Campur tangan militer dalam politik di Turki kembali terjadi dengan kudeta 
militer langsung pada 15 Juli 2016, namun kudeta tersebut mengalami 
kegagalan. Padahal, militer Turki sebelumnya berhasil melakukan kudeta 
langsung maupun tidak langsung pada tahun 1960, 1971, 1980 dan 1997. Dari 
masalah tersebut, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis penyebab 
kegagalan kudeta 2016 serta menggambarkan penyebab terjadinya kudeta 
dan membandingkan kudeta 2016 dengan kudeta langsung 1960 dan 1980. 
Metode kualitatif digunakan dengan melakukan studi pustaka, serta data yang 
bersumber pada jurnal ilmiah, pemberitaan, artikel, dan sumber lainnya yang 
terkait. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan, kegagalan kudeta militer pada 2016 
tidak hanya dikarenakan penolakan dari masyarakat tetapi juga kegagalan 
kelompok kudeta dalam menangkap aktor-aktor kunci pemerintahan seperti 
Presiden Erdogan dan Perdana Menteri Binali Yildirim. Kegagalan menangkap 
aktor kunci tersebut membuat mereka mampu memobilisasi massa melawan 
kelompok kudeta, seperti yang dilakukan Presiden Erdogan yang 
mengumumkan penolakan kudeta melalui FaceTime yang disiarkan CNN Turk 
serta mengajak masyarakat menolak kudeta tersebut. Penolakan yang sama 
juga dilakukan oleh Binali Yildirim. Inilah salah satu faktor yang menyebabkan 
turunnya masyarakat Turki ke jalanan menolak upaya kudeta. Padahal melihat 
kudeta sebelumnya, militer selalu mendapatkan dukungan dari masyarakat 
Turki. Di samping itu juga terdapat peran teknologi yang menghubungkan 
aktor kunci dengan masyarakat Turki. Penelitian ini berkontribusi dalam 
menjelaskan pentingnya peran aktor kunci negara dalam melawan kudeta 
militer, serta memberikan gambaran cara bagi pemerintah sipil dan 
masyarakat umum dalam mengatasi kudeta militer. 
Kata Kunci: Kudeta Militer, Erdogan, Teknologi, Turki 
 
ABSTRACT 
Military interference in politics in Turkey resumed with an outright military coup 
on July 15, 2016, but the Coup failed. The Turkish military has always successfully 
conducted coups, both directly and indirectly, which occurred in 1960, 1971, 
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1980, and 1997. From these problems, The study aims to analyze the causes of 
the failure of the 2016 coup and describe the causes of the Coup and compare the 
2016 coup with the 1960 and 1980 direct coups. A qualitative method was used 
in this research by conducting literature studies and data sourced from scientific 
journals, news reports, articles, and other related sources. The results showed 
that the failure of the military Coup in 2016 was due to rejection from the 
community but also the failure of the coup group to arrest key government actors 
such as President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. The failure to 
arrest these key actors enabled them to mobilize the masses against the coup 
group, as did President Erdogan, who announced his rejection of the Coup 
through FaceTime broadcast by CNN Turk and invited the public to reject the 
Coup. Binali Yildirim also rejected the same problem. This is one of the factors 
that led to the descent of Turks to the streets against the coup attempt. Even 
though seeing the previous Coup, the military always received support from the 
Turkish people. In addition, there is also the role of technology that connects key 
actors with Turkish society. This research explains the important role of key state 
actors in countering military coups and provides an overview of ways for civilian 
governments and the general public to resist military coups. 
Keywords: Military Coup, Erdogan, Technology, Turkey 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Pretorianism or commonly referred to as military intervention into 
politics, has always been an interesting study to study and observe, especially 
regarding coups. Moreover, the trend of military coups is currently continuing 
to decline. Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne (2011) stated that from 1950 
to 2010, there were 457 coup attempts, of which 230 (50.3 percent) failed, and 
227 (49.7 percent) succeeded. Even from 2011 to 2017, there were 29 with 
only seven successful coups and 22 failed coups (McCarthy, 2017). One such 
failed Coup occurred in Turkey in 2016. So it is interesting to see what caused 
the military Coup in Turkey to fail, whereas the direct coups in 1960 and 1980 
and indirectly in 1971 and 1997 experienced success. 
In the case of Turkey, the military was in power during the time of 
Mustafa Kemal. However, the role of the Turkish military changed to that of 
guardian or overseer of Turkish secularism after 1923 (Perlmutter, 2000). The 
Turkish military will interfere in politics when the military considers civilians 
a threat due to various factors such as the threat of secular ideology, internal 
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conflicts of political or civil parties that cause political instability, poor 
economy, and threats from separatists. The intervention will be carried out by 
the military either directly (through a coup in which the military takes power 
directly from the legitimate government and declares the government to be 
subordinate to the military) or indirectly (half-coup, where the military 
ultimatums and threatens to take over the civilian government by the military 
when the state is deemed to be under threat). 
The military's dominant role in politics in Turkey was already evident 
in the early days of Mustafa Kemal's reign. However, Mustafa Kemal changed 
the position of the military, which at first was very domineering, then became 
the protagonist, namely that the military played a role in maintaining the 
principle of Kemalism with the excuse of protecting the Turkish constitution. 
The military's role was slowly changed by Mustafa Kemal, as seen in Article 
148 of the Military Law, which was enacted in 1930andh contained a 5-year 
prison sentence for the military who participated in political parties and 
political activities. This is then confirmed in article 35 of the Internal Law of 
the Armed Forces, which contains the main task of the armed forces, namely 
protecting and defending Turkish land. This provision was later reaffirmed in 
1961. The Turkish military used the article as the basis or basis for intervening 
or intervening in Turkish politics. These interventions are usually 
accompanied by the defense of the Kemalist ideology and the threat to state 
security (Hale, 2011). 
The military continued to play its loyalty to the regime and participated 
in Ataturk's programs until before 1950. At this time, there was a symbiosis 
between the military and its single party, the CHP (Republican People's Party). 
Only entering 1950, the political map in Turkey began to change with the 
victory of the DP (Democratic Party / Democratic Party) led by Adnan 
Manderes by defeating the CHP party. However, on May 27, 1960, for the first 
time, the military carried out a direct coup against the government of Adnan 
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Menderes, citing political and economic instability (Hale, 2011). This first 
Coup saw the Turkish military act as watchdogs or guards. 
After the direct Coup in 1960, the Democratic party was dissolved by 
the military. Since then, the power has been in the hands of the National Unity 
Committee (KPN) led by General Cemal Gursel, who was later appointed as 
Head of State concurrently Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Basyar, 
2015). After forming a civilian government and the election of a parliament, 
the military gave power back to civilians in 1961. 
The indirect Coup reaffirmed the military's role as a guard in 1971, the 
direct Coup in 1980, the indirect Coup in 1997, and the direct Coup in 2016. 
The military intervention in Turkish politics was successful through the direct 
coups of 1960 and 1980 and the indirect Coup. Directly in 1971 and 1980. This 
can be seen from the success of the military taking power or replacing civilians 
who are considered a threat or unsuccessful in running their government. 
However, the military failed to intervene in the form of a direct coup in 2016. 
The direct Coup, launched on July 15, 2016, was initially considered successful 
but ultimately failed (Anadolu Agency, 2016). So it is interesting to see what 
factors caused the failure of military intervention or intervention in the 2016 
direct coup.  
Several researchers have previously explained the causes of the failure 
of the military Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Caliskan (2017), for example, 
mentions that one of the factors in the failure of the military Coup carried out 
by the Gulenist Faction on July 15, 2016, was the rejection that came from the 
community. The descent of the Turkish people into the streets is a form of 
public rejection of the Coup launched by the military. This public rejection of 
the coup attempt was the first time in Turkish history (Caliskan, 2017). Other 
writers such as Yayla (2016) also support the rejection theory even though he 
prefers the rejection to come from various community groups, including 
political forces. According to him, the failure of the Turkish military Coup was 
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caused by rejection from political party leaders, both from the AKP and the 
opposition, rejection from various circles of society, the courts, and the media. 
As for Unay and Dilek (2016), the Turkish military Coup on July 16, 
2016, occurred at an inopportune time. The Coup occurred when Turkey's 
economy was relatively stable with relatively good economic growth. For 
them, this is the reason for the rejection from the public for the Coup carried 
out by the military. This is in contrast to the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 in 
Turkey. During the Coup, Turkey was experiencing an economic crisis, so the 
military Coup was supported by the Turkish people. 
Caliskan, Yayla, Unay, and Dilek have the same view in seeing the cause 
of the failure of the Coup, namely the rejection of the community. In contrast 
to the researcher's view, this study looks at the failure of the military Coup in 
Turkey on July 15, 2016, not only due to the rejection from the public but also 
the failure of the coup group to arrest key actors in the government, especially 
the failure to arrest President Erdogan. This failure to arrest President Erdoan 
allowed him to give orders to the public to reject the coup attempt. In the 
Coup's failure, we can also see how the role of technology used by key actors 
to reach the masses in opposing the Coup and the information that occurred 
when the Coup occurred. 
Edward Luttwak (1979) mentions a successful coup involves two 
stages, namely (1) direct takeover and (2) winning and maintaining control. 
These two stages are important for a coup to be successful. The first stage is to 
arrest and neutralize key installations and players such as the government, 
defense, and public order ministries, military and police headquarters, 
television and telecommunications facilities, key transportation, and 
detention of government leaders and other potential opponents. Thus, this 
first stage destabilizes the situation and eliminates the old control regime 
"over critical state mechanisms". The second stage is a more difficult and 
sensitive stage which requires the coup d'etat to use organs confiscated from 
the state to stabilize or restore the situation. This can be achieved by ensuring 
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unity within the coup forces, winning the support of the bureaucracy and the 
military, maintaining public order, and striving to gain conformity, 
cooperation, and popular acceptance. This needs to be done so that there is no 
opposition to the Coup carried out. 
This study uses the coup theory described by Edward Luttwak. This is 
because Luttwak's view talks about how to overthrow the government quickly 
and precisely and the importance of capturing key actors. This view can be 
used to look at the case of the Failed Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, where 
at the beginning of the Coup, the military managed to control strategic places 
but failed to capture key actors. 
This study describes the causal factors and how these factors 
influenced the failure of the military Coup in Turkey in 2016 by analyzing 
when the Coup was carried out until it failed using Edward Luttwak's coup 
theory. In addition, this study also describes the reasons used by the military 
to carry out a coup and compares the direct coups carried out by the military 
in 1960 and 1980 with this 2016 coup. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research uses qualitative methods because this research 
emphasizes more on "words," not "numbers," with the researcher as the key 
instrument (Margret et al., 2014). In addition, the data analysis is 
qualitative/inductive, and the results emphasize meaning. The data is 
obtained through documentation obtained through various data sources such 
as books, journals, articles, papers, videos and news from mainstream media 
which discuss the chronology of the Coup, the history of the Coup to the failure 
of the military Coup in Turkey so that it can answer research questions. The 
data obtained were then analyzed and presented in a descriptive-analytic 
manner by describing the role of the military in Turkey because of the Coup's 
failure, and a comparison was made of the coups that have occurred in Turkey. 
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The stages of the data analysis technique carried out in this study are, 
First, the data obtained through books, journals, articles, papers, videos, and 
news from mainstream media relevant to the research are collected as much 
as possible. Second, the data that has been collected is validated so that the 
data obtained is valid and unbiased. Third, the data obtained are then grouped 
according to the topic of discussion. Fourth, the data is then analyzed and 
interpreted so that the information obtained can answer research questions 
and provide conclusions. In analyzing this problem, Edward Luttwak's coup 
theory is used because this theory has been widely used to explain the failure 
or success in a country. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Cause of Coup 
Before the failure of the direct Coupon on July 15, 2016, the military 
had always been successful in intervening in Turkish politics, either in direct 
coups or in semi-coups. Military intervention through coups has occurred 
since 1960 with a direct coup against the government of Adnan Menderes, a 
half-coup in 1971 against the government of Sulayman Demirel, a direct coup 
in 1980, and the last half-coup in 1997 under Erbakan's reign. Interventions 
through such coups have always been successful, especially those carried out 
directly. However, the direct Coup launched by the Turkish military on July 15, 
2016, failed. The cause of the failure of the military Coup is then interesting to 
study. 
Regarding the reasons for the direct Coup on July 15, 2016, it still needs 
further investigation. Atilla Yayla (2016) stated that the coup attempt that took 
place on July 15, 2016, was carried out by the Gulenist military group (Gulenist 
Terror Organization (FETO)), which intended to overthrow the legitimate 
government. Yayla explained that the motivation for carrying out this Coup 
was not based on protecting secular values but obeying orders from their 
leader, Fetullah Gulen, who was opposed to Erdogan because the AKP and 
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Erdogan began to arrest Gulen supporters who were considered to have 
established a parallel state. The Gulen network exists in various government, 
military, educational, and business structures. Yayla argued that this Coup was 
carried out by the radical Islamic movement led by Fetullah Gulen, not the 
military guarding secular ideology. Koray Caliskan (2017) also mentioned that 
the Coup was carried out on July 15, 2016, because Gulen's network in the 
military was the last network to fight the government, which continued to 
reduce Gulen's power in the bureaucracy, media, courts, and business. 
Yayla and Caliskan's opinion is different from that of Francesco F. Milan. 
According to Milan (2016), the reason that the 2016 military coup was carried 
out because of the large number of dismissed military officers is not a strong 
reason why the Coup was carried out. Milan said that the military Coup in 2016 
was triggered by the former's dissatisfaction with Erdogan's failed foreign 
policy. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's vision of zero problems with 
neighboring countries did not work. Erdogan's approach to the civil conflict in 
Syria has been criticized, especially from the CHP. Criticism also came from 
media such as Hurriyet (secular media) and Zaman (pro-Gulen). Since 2005, 
ISIS attacks on Turkey, especially the bombing tragedy in Ankara, have caused 
anxiety in Turkish society. 
From some existing data and writings, there are indications that the 
Coup perpetrators were from the Gulenist group, but of course, this needs 
more in-depth research. These indications can be seen from the confession of 
the former followers of Gulen, the Chief of the General Staff who was arrested 
by the coup group, the confession of the coup group, video recordings, and 
other evidence. This is by what Caliskan (2017) conveyed, who argues that 
Fetullah Gulen's network spreads to various institutions ranging from 
bureaucrats, education, courts, companies, and the military. The professor 
from Harvard Kennedy School, Dani Rodrik (2016), also shares the same view 
that the Gulen movement focuses not only on school and charity activities but 
is far from it. Rodrik (2016) explained that they carried out wiretapping, 
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disinformation, extortion, and judicial manipulation, especially in their 
controlled institutions. The Gulen Movement is a highly hierarchical 
organization. People who have followed him for years (such as Hanefi Avci or 
Rusen Cakir) report that very few important decisions go unnoticed by Gulen. 
Gulen also has many sympathizers in the military, which is the last 
bastion for Gulenists to survive in politics in Turkey. This is because the 
government purged the Gulenist power in the media, courts, police, 
corporations, and education. Rodrik (2016) stated that the Gulen network had 
begun to enter military institutions since the arrest of the secular military for 
the alleged Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases during 2008-2011. These 
positions were then filled by the Gulenists, who were formerly close to 
Erdogan. And even the Kemalist military had no reason to stage a coup in 2016 
because the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases had been dropped, and 
Erdogan did not want to be involved in them. Before the Coup, the government 
planned to purge Gulen's network of military institutions in August. The 
Gulenist faction in the military took action before the government carried out 
a purge within the military. 
One sign of the involvement of the Gulenist faction in this Coup was 
when The coup group took general Hulusi Akar hostage. Hakan Evrim of the 
coup group offers Akar to talk to Gulen, but Akar refuses the offer. This 
statement is reinforced by Akar's testimony that the coup groups attempted to 
link him with Fetullah Gulen to talk to him (Rodrik, 2016). 
Lieutenant Colonel Levent Turkkan, a former aide to the Chief of 
General Staff Hulusi Akar, also testified that he was a Gulenist involved in the 
Coup. He testified that he had spied on activities within the Turkish military 
and top military officials, such as wiretapping the Chief of Staff Necdet Ozel. He 
also said that 60-70 percent of those involved in the Coup were Gulenists. 
Turkkan stated, "I believe 60-70 percent of those people who have been 
accepted inside the armed forces since the 1990s are linked to Gulen" 
(Anadolu Agency, 2016). 
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Several of the arrested coup groups also acknowledged Gulen's role. 
This was also supplemented by evidence of the participation of former police 
officers involved in the Coup. The former police officer was previously fired for 
alleged ties to Gulen. Other testimonies also came from several military 
officials who acknowledged their loyalty to Gulen. As testimony from the 
Turkkans, not 100 percent of the coup plotters were Gulenists, but those 
outside the Gulen group did not like Erdogan. The former Chief of the General 
Staff of Turkey, General Ilker Basbug, said that, apart from the Gulenists, others 
may be displeased with Erdogan's rule in the coup attempt (Tol, Mainzer, & 
Ekmekci, 2016). This means that most of the groups involved in the coup 
attempt were driven by the Gulenist faction in the military, supported by 
groups who dislike Erdogan. However, of course, an in-depth research is 
needed about who the perpetrators of the Coup were. 
Despite these differences of opinion, the military Coup carried out by 
the Turkish military on July 15, 2016, was based on reasons to restore 
constitutional order, human rights, and freedoms. The military uses Ataturk's 
motto, namely "Peace at Home Council." However, this reasoning is not 
appropriate because there is no threat or economic instability like the 
previous coups. In the 1960 coup, the 1971 half coup, 1980, and the 1997 half 
coup, the military always used economic, political, and threats from Islam or 
anything that threatened the Kemalist ideology. The third or one of these 
reasons is always used as an excuse by the military to intervene or take over 
the government. However, the Coup that took place on July 15, 2016, had a 
different context from the previous Coup, due to the absence of political or 
economic instability in Turkey. The reason for the Coup due to economic or 
political instability is unacceptable. 
Failed Coup 
Edward Luttwak (1979) mentions a successful coup involves two 
stages, namely (1) direct takeover and (2) winning and maintaining control. In 
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the military Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, the coup group attempted to 
control important cities in Turkey, including Istanbul and Ankara. This Coup 
was carried out at 10.00 pm on July 15, 2016. At first, the coup group 
succeeded in taking control of the state broadcaster (TRT) and the general staff 
headquarters in Angkara. The coup group also managed to control the 
Bosphorus Bridge and Fatih Sultan Mehmet bridge connecting Asia and 
Europe located in Istanbul, bombed the parliament building, and arrested the 
Chief of General Staff, Hulusi Akar (Al Jazeera, 2017). The coup group also 
arrested Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Guler, General Salih Zeki Colak, 
Gendarmerie Commander General Galip Mendi, Air Force Commander Abidin 
Unal, and Turkish Navy Commander Bulent Bostanoglu. The declaration of the 
Coup was made through the official High Command website and state TV TRT. 
Coup plotters also used tanks, heavy armor, attack helicopters, and warplanes 
(Gurcan, 2016). 
The explanation above shows that in the first stage of the Coup, the coup 
plotters seemed to have succeeded in controlling strategic places and 
capturing key military actors. However, the coup plotters failed to arrest key 
state actors such as President Erdogan and Turkish Prime Minister Binali 
Yıldırım. Whereas the first step that must be done, as said by Luttwak, is to 
neutralize key actors such as the President and the Prime Minister. This caused 
the two actors to be successful in garnering public support to take to the 
streets to resist the coup attempt and being successful in garnering support 
from the military. However, the coup plotters failed to arrest President 
Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. 
CNN Turk said a coup plotter attempted to arrest President Erdoan at a 
hotel located in Maramis by fielding about 25 soldiers. However, these efforts 
failed (Hanifan, 2016). Just as the arrests were about to occur, Erdogan left the 
hotel and flew to Istanbul's Ataturk International Airport to resist the coup 
attempt (Anadolu Agency 2016). An eyewitness testified to the BBC that he 
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heard helicopters and gunfire in Marmaris after Erdogan left the premises 
(BBC, 2016). 
Serkan Yazici, who is the owner of the hotel where Erdogan is staying, 
testified on the Coup night. He said, "I offered the president to take him to the 
Greek islands, but he got upset with my offer and continued, 'what will I do in 
the Greek islands? I'm asking you how to go to Istanbul'. Daily Sabah (2016 ) 
also reported that about 30 soldiers descended from helicopters to attack 
Erdogan. There was a shootout between Erdogan's bodyguards and the coup 
group at the hotel, which killed two of Erdogan's bodyguards and injured 
seven others. The night after the Coup, Turkish troops managed to confiscate 
weapons. Allegedly used by the coup group during the attack on Erdogan's 
lodging, 12 assault rifles and three grenades were found in a wooded area near 
the Grand Yazıcı Marmaris Hotel. Police also confiscated assault rifles, pistols, 
grenades, ammunition, helmets, body armor, and night vision equipment near 
the hotel (Anadolu Agency, 2016). 
The attempted arrest of President Erdogan in Marmaris was admitted 
by one of the soldiers who participated in the attack, General Gokhan 
Sonmezates, in court. Gokhan Sonmezates said, "My mission was to take the 
president and bring him to Akinci air base safe and sound" (Pamuk, 2017). The 
attempted arrest or assassination of Erdoan was also witnessed by people 
staying at the hotel and admitting that there was indeed an attack by the 
military using helicopters and other combat weapons against their hotel 
(Thompson, 2016). Ali Gundogan, a local journalist who was at the scene, also 
testified that the coup groups told him they didn't want to hurt the residents. 
They just wanted to arrest President Erdogan (Gutman, 2016). Erdogan also 
testified in the media that he and his family would die if they remained in the 
hotel 10 to 15 minutes before he left the hotel (Middle East Eye, 2017). 
Erdogan then decided to go to Istanbul. From the Marmaris hotel, Erdoan took 
a helicopter to Dalaman Airport, near the Aegean coast, who then switched to 
using a business jet and decided to fly to Istanbul (Gutman, 2016). 
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Attempts to assassinate Erdogan did not stop there. According to a 
Reuters report, on the flight to Istanbul, two F-16 fighter jets driven by the 
coup group had locked Erdogan's plane within shooting range. Still, anti-
terrorism officials quoted by The Guardian said that fire was not fired after the 
plane pilot tricked him. the Gulenist group mentioned that it was a Turkish 
Airlines flight (civil aviation) (The Guardian, 2016). This caused Erdogan to 
land in Istanbul successfully. 
Erdogan's success in escaping his arrest was also due to the 
contribution of Ziya Ilgen, who informed Erdogan that soldiers were patrolling 
the Bosphorus Bridge and conducting checks (Sahin, 2017). First Army 
Commander Umit Dundar, who is in Istanbul, called Erdogan an hour before 
the arrival of the Gulenists. Umit Dundar called Erdogan and informed him that 
a coup had taken place and three Blackhawk helicopters carrying rebel 
soldiers were on their way to kill or capture him. Dundar also convinced 
Erdogan to come to Istanbul. Dundar said, "I am at your side, there is a huge 
coup, and the situation is out of control in Ankara. Come to Istanbul, and I will 
secure your access to the roads and accommodations there" (El Bar, 2016). 
The explanation above shows that information about the Coup was leaked and 
reached Erdogan, which caused Erdogan to escape from the Gulenist group's 
arrest attempt. 
Erdogan's choice of landing in Istanbul was due to Umit Dundar's 
security guarantee. However, apart from that, the election of Istanbul as a 
landing is also inseparable from the political aspect, namely the influence that 
Erdogan has in the city. As a former mayor who is considered successful in 
changing the face of Istanbul, Erdogan's arrival at Ataturk Airport was 
welcomed by his loyalists. The choice of the city of Istanbul is also due to the 
condition of the capital Ankara which is still not safe. Erdogan's safe landing in 
Istanbul is a sign that the Coup failed. 
Attempts were also made to arrest Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. 
Gulenists attacked Prime Minister Binali Yildirim's convoy. This attack by 
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members of the Gendarmerie was carried out on Friday night, July 15, 2016, 
on the border of the northern province of Kastamonu, when Yildirim was 
traveling from Istanbul to Ankara to control the emergency caused by the 
Coup. Hurriyet Daily News quoted the Minister of Home Affairs, Efkan Ala, as 
saying, "Coup attempters targeted Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım's car as well." 
The road trip was taken at Yildirim's request. This is due to the risk of unsafe 
air travel. The journey is carried out by convoy and takes an alternative route 
through Kostamonu. And having survived the attack, Yildirim was taken to the 
district governor's house. He then monitored developments and stayed until 
the Ankara situation was normal (Hurriyet, 2016). Binali Yildirim finally 
managed to escape the arrest attempt. 
The failure of the coup group to arrest the key government actors was 
a recklessness that affected the outcome of the Coup. This led to President 
Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim being able to rally forces to fight 
the attempted Coup. With the power of the media and technological advances, 
the two figures expressed their rejection of the attempted Coup and asked the 
public to reject it. 
The first rejection of the attempted Coup came from Prime Minister 
Binali Yildirim. Yildirim conducted a telephone interview with the NTV station 
at 11 pm. Yildirim stated that there had been an attempted coup by part of the 
military (Popp, 2017). Through the television station, Yildirim expressed his 
condemnation and rejection of the attempted Coup. Yildirim said "There was 
an illegal act by a group within the military that was acting out of the chain of 
military command. Our people should know that we will not allow any activity 
that would harm democracy." Yildirim said that the security forces would 
respond to the attempted Coup (Worley & Feliks, 2016). 
Rejection of the attempted Coup also came from President Erdogan. 
Through the FaceTime application using an iPhone, Erdogan interviewed CNN 
Turk with Hande Firat, head of CNN Turk in Ankara, broadcast live at 12.24 
midnight. Through the interview, Erdogan said that the coup act was carried 
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out outside the chain of command and was a parallel state-driven uprising. 
Erdogan condemned the attempted Coup and threatened severe punishment 
for the coup perpetrators. Erdogan also called on the public to take to the 
streets, gather in squares and airports. Erdogan added, "Go to the streets and 
give them their answer." Through this interview, Erdogan also expressed his 
desire to fly to Ankara (Pagliery, Pallotta, & Ellis, 2016). However, his desire to 
fly to Ankara changed after getting a call from Umit Dundar, who told him to 
go to Istanbul and guarantee his safety (Popp, 2017). In the end, Erdogan 
decided to fly to Istanbul. 
The Turkish public welcomed Erdogan's call to the public to take to the 
streets against the attempted Coup. Erdogan's call caused more and more 
people to take to the streets to reject the attempted Coup (Duran & Altun, 
2016). The call to prayer is held in Turkish mosques to appeal to the public to 
reject the attempted Coup. After Erdogan's call, in several locations, masses of 
Erdogan supporters took to the streets to reject the attempted Coup by 
chanting 'Allahu Ekber' and using the Rabia symbol, which is a symbol of 
solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood after Mohammad Morsi was in the 
Coup in Egypt. Erdoan then landed at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport at 03.00 am, 
after a mass of supporters captured the airport. In front of his supporters and 
under the banner of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Erdogan made a public statement 
on television by again condemning the coup act. He vowed to punish the coup 
groups (IISS, 2016) severely. 
Veysel Kurt said that the failure of the Turkish military Coup, apart from 
the rejection from the people, was the strong leadership of Erdogan, who was 
able to bolster the masses against the Coup and appear to reject the Coup. 
Erdogan's appearance via FaceTime on the CNN Turk television channel by 
giving information on the rejection of the Coup, according to Muhittin Ataman 
and Gloria Shkurti, directly impacted the Coup's failure. Before Erdogan's call, 
there were already people who came down to reject the Coup. However, more 
and more people took to the streets after Erdogan appeared, asking people to 
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take to the streets to reject the Coup. Erdogan's presence through FaceTime 
on CNN Turk succeeded in mobilizing the masses to oppose the Coup (Duran 
& Altun, 2016). People taking to the streets to secure important locations such 
as the main airport and television stations respond to Erdogan's call for people 
to take to the streets. People who took to the streets in response to Erdogan's 
call came from the mosque and from the entire spectrum of Turkish society 
(Ataman, 2016). 
Erdogan's central role is also evident from Nebi Mis's research, which 
states that four statements often appear when people take to the streets "to 
protect Erdogan." Meanwhile, one of the four main criteria for the decline of 
the public against the Coup is Erdogan's call on FaceTime for people to take to 
the streets (Ataman, 2017). The presence of Erdoan and Binali Yildirim also 
gave peace to the people and raised the spirit of the people to reject the Coup. 
The public also considered that Erdogan's leadership and crisis management 
were the most prominent factors in thwarting the Coup (Mis et al., 2016). 
From the above view, it is seen the importance of capturing key state 
actors. Although the military managed to control strategic places at first, it 
failed to neutralize these key actors. The failure of the Gulenists to arrest key 
government actors, such as President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali 
Yildirim, was one of the causes of the failed Coup. The failure of this Coup was 
seen when the two key figures appeared on television stations condemning the 
attempted Coup and also asking the public to reject the attempted Coup. The 
failure was even more apparent when Erdogan landed safely in Istanbul, which 
his supporters greeted. He succeeded in mobilizing the strength of the Islamist 
and secular camps. Through FaceTime broadcast by CNN Turk, Erdogan was 
able to mobilize the masses against the Coup. 
In addition, Erdogan also tried to convince the secular camp by holding 
a conference under Mustafa Kemal's photo, which showed that he was a 
Kemalist. On the other hand, he also did not lose the mass of his Islamic 
supporters. This is because Erdogan is considered an Islamic figure and 
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represents the AKP who managed to win 49.50 percent of the vote in the 
November 1, 2015, election. This can also be seen from the Islamic symbols 
present at the time of the Coup when Erdoan masses chanted Takbir and the 
symbol "Rabia" at the beginning of the people's resistance to the Coup. The 
symbol of "Raabia" itself is a symbol of solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, which was led by Mohammad Morsi, who was overthrown by the 
military. Mohammad Morsi himself is Erdogan's closest ally in Egypt. And 
Erdogan condemned the coup act carried out by the Egyptian military. 
This shows how big key actors' influence can mobilize the masses to 
fight the attempted Coup. The 2016 coup demonstrated the importance of 
capturing key actors, both military and government actors. The need to arrest 
these key actors is also evident from the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 
described in table 1, where the coup group controlled strategic places and 
neutralized key actors from the military and government. This is different 
from the direct 2016 coup, which only arrested military actors but failed to 
arrest government actors, namely President Erdogan and Prime Minister 
Binali Yildirim, which was one of the causes of the failed Coup. 
The 1960 coup was carried out against the Democratic Party and the 
government of Adnan Menderes. Through a bloodless coup in 1960, the coup 
plot led by Cemal Gursel succeeded in overthrowing the government and 
arresting key government actors such as President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes, and officials from the Democratic Party who were deemed 
to have violated the constitution (Hidayat, 2015). Adnan Menderes himself 
was later sentenced to death along with two of his ministers. The military 
carried out a coup due to the threat of the state and the Kemalist ideology due 
to economic, political instability, and the growing issue of Islam. Adnan 
Menderes is considered to have exploited Islam to gain political support. Over 
the radio, the coup plotters announce the takeover of power. The success of 
this Coup cannot be separated from the support of the people who consider 
the Adnan Menderes government to have failed in overcoming domestic 
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economic, and political problems. When the military Coup was successful, 
Turkish people took to the streets to celebrate and support the military action 
(Rothman, 2016). 
In the 1980 coup, the military also arrested all political leaders and 
actors in Turkey, such as Bulent Evecit and Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demeriyel. Coup plotters also controlled strategic places, such as the 
Bosphorus Bridge and state radio (Global Security, 2013). The reasons for the 
Coup were economic instability, domestic political instability, and the 
increasing symbolism of Islam brought by Necbettin Erbakan's National 
Salvation Party. The 1980 coup was also supported by Turkish society, which 
was saturated with endless conflicts and political instability (Dzakirin, 2012). 
Table 1 shows a comparison between the direct coups of 1960 and 
1980 with the 2016 coup, especially regarding the Coup results, where the 
1960 and 1980 coups were successful while the 2016 coup failed. This study 
observes that the direct coups in 1960 and 1980 had different economic and 
political contexts from the direct coups in 2016, which gave rise to different 
responses from the public. During the 1960 and 1960 coups, Turkey's 
economic and political conditions were unstable. 
As for the 2016 coup, Turkey's economic and political conditions were 
relatively stable. In the 1960 and 1980 coups, coup plotters also managed to 
control strategic places and arrest key government actors. This Coup also 
received support from the community. In the 2016 coup, the coup plotters 
failed to arrest President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. The 
public also rejected the 2016 coup. This means that the 1960 and 1980 coups 
succeeded in carrying out the first and second stages, namely (1) controlling 
strategic places and capturing key actors and (2) garnering support from the 
community, the military, and the international community. However, in the 
2016 coup, the coup plotters were unable to carry out both stages. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the Direct Coup of 1960, 1980, and 2016 





































Coup plotters control 
state communication 
tools such as radio, 
state television, the 
Bosphorus bridge, and 
government centers 
The coup plotters 
controlled the state's 
communication tools, 
namely the TRT 
television station, the 
general staff 
headquarters in 
Angkara, the airport, 
the Fatih Sultan 
Mehmet Bridge, and 
the Bosphorus 
connecting Asia and 
Europe in Istanbul, 





Arrest of Key 
State Actors 
Arrested President 
Celal Bayar, Prime 
Minister Adnan 
Menderes, and officials 
from the Democratic 
Party. 
Adnan Menderes and 
two of his ministers 





political actors such as 
Bulent Evecit and 
Necbettin Erbakan. 
Succeeded in 
arresting Chief of 
General Staff Hulusi 
Akar, Deputy Chief of 
Staff General Yasar 
Guler, Army 
Commander General 
Salih Zeki Colak, 
Gendarmerie 
Commander General 
Galip Mendi, Air Force 
Commander Abidin 
Unal and Turkish 
Navy Commander 
Bulent Bostanoglu. 
However, it failed to 
capture key 
government actors 
such as President 





Support the Coup Support the Coup Refusing the Coup 
Source: processed by researchers from various sources. 
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The failure in the first stage, namely capturing key state actors, resulted 
in the second stage's inability to carry out the Coup. The second stage is how 
the coup plotters use the tools of the state they have controlled to attract the 
support of the public, the military, and the international community. Although 
the military was able to control strategic places and control state TV, the coup 
plotters could not attract the sympathy of the civilian population and the 
military. The results will be different if the coup group successfully neutralizes 
President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. There is a possibility 
that the Coup will be successful. One factor in the emergence of public rejection 
is Erdogan's call to the public to take to the streets to reject the coup attempt. 
The public welcomed Erdogan's call. 
Another interesting thing about the failure of the military Coup in 
Turkey is the technological advances that President Erdogan and Prime 
Minister Binali Yıldırım have exploited. Through FaceTime and social media 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, the two figures could garner public 
support to resist the coup attempt. Changes in society and technology 
indirectly affect the failure of the Coup. Without this technology, Erdogan and 
Binali Yıldırım would not be able to rally the masses against the Coup quickly. 
The failure to arrest key actors and the inability of the coup plotters to control 
social media led to the coup attempt being opposed by the Turkish public. In 
the end, July 15, 2016, was thwarted with 238 people dead and 2190 injured. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2016 military coup in Turkey was to restore constitutional order, 
human rights, and freedoms. However, the Coup that was launched failed. One 
of the contributing factors was the failure of the coup plotters to arrest key 
state actors, especially President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, 
who are important symbols of Turkey. Using advances in technology, Erdoan 
and Binali Yildirim moved people into the streets to oppose the coup attempt. 
Arresting key state actors is an important part of the two phases of a coup. As 
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a result, the second phase of the Coup was to gain public support, which other 
military factions and international support failed to obtain. The rejection of the 
community happened because key state actors succeeded in mobilizing the 
masses against the Coup. This distinguishes the 2016 military coup from the 
1960 and 1980 coups, wherein the 1960 and 1980 key state actors were 
neutralized, and the Coup was successful. 
The description of the causes of the failure of the military Coup in 
Turkey can provide input for the civilian government and the general public in 
dealing with in the event of a coup so that the key state actors in the world 
must realize how important their role is in resisting the coup attempt and 
influencing the public to reject the Coup. It will be interesting to investigate 
further how the impact of the military's role in politics when the Coup failed, 
especially considering the case in Turkey after the failed Coup in 2016. 
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